

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUENOS 05842 01 OF 03 282115Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 SS-15 SP-02 SSO-00  
L-03 H-01 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00  
TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 ICAE-00 EB-08  
COME-00 MCE-00 /091 W  
-----004147 282240Z /13

O R 282032Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6723  
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
DOD WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 5842

E. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX, AR  
SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:  
ARGENTINA

REF: (A) STATE 167901 (B) STATE 168320 (C) STATE 182987

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. UNDER LEGISLATION CURRENTLY  
DUE TO TAKE EFFECT ON OCTOBER 1, 1978, ARGENTINA WILL  
NOT, ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS, BE ELIBIBLE TO RECEIVE  
FMS CASH OR CREDIT, IMET TRAINING OR LICENSES FOR  
EXPORT OF MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS. IN THE POSSIBILITY  
HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS WILL PERMIT REOPENING THE  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO ARGENTINA AND IN ORDER  
TO HAVE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON THE ARGENTINE  
MILITARY AND POST'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT  
ORGANIZATION ON RECORD, WE ARE SUBMITTING THE  
FOLLOWING REPORT. AT PRESENT THE MISSION INCLUDES  
A SIX-OFFICER MILGROUP WHICH IS ADMINISTERING ON-GOING  
PROGRAMS AND WILL CONTINUE TO HANDLE PIPELINE ITEMS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 05842 01 OF 03 282115Z

FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 1 CUTOFF. DUE TO THE IMPORTANCE  
AND INFLUENCE OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY FOR REASONS  
ENUMERATED IN THIS REPORT, THE MILGROUP WILL CONTINUE  
TO PLAN AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN MAINTAINING ACCESS TO AND  
COMMUNICATION WITH HOST COUNTRY ARMED FORCES.  
END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

3 A (1) US INTERESTS. THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES HAVE HISTORICALLY PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE NATION. SINCE THE 1930S THEY HAVE ALTERNATED GOVERNMENTS WITH ELECTED CIVILIANS AND EVEN WHEN NOT IN POWER TEND TO ACT AS OVERSEER OR GUARANTOR TO CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATIONS. AT PRESENT THE MILITARY IS AGAIN IN POWER AND LIKELY TO REMAIN FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND FORE-SEEABLE FUTURE. FOR THAT REASON US BILATERAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES ARE NECESSARILY CONDUCTED THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES. ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANCE TO US SECURITY INTERESTS DERIVES FROM ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION ON THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, ITS POSITION ASTRIDE THE STRAITS OF MAGELLAN, ITS ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE AS A POTENTIAL "BREADBASKED" FOR THE THIRD WORLD AND PETROLEUM SUPPLIER IN THE NEAR TERM, AND ITS TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY IN THE NUCLEAR AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS. ARGENTINA IS ALSO STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND CONCERNED WITH OFF-SETTING SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION IN THIRD WORLD AREAS. THE CURRENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO IDENTIFY ARGENTINA WITH THE WEST IN PURSUIT OF WESTERN DEMOCRATIC GOALS AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, AND ORIGINALLY SOUGHT TO STRENGTHEN TIES TO WESTERN NATIONS AS LOGICAL PARTNERS AND ALLIES. THE EXISTENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ARGENTINA, HOWEVER, HAS OBSTRUCTED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND HURT ARGENTINA'S IMAGE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE US. US SECURITY ASSISTANCE SUPPORTING THE MODERNIZATION AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 05842 01 OF 03 282115Z

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES HELPS PROVIDE THE HOST GOVERNMENT WITH THE MILITARY STRENGTH AND STABILITY NECESSARY TO DETER COMMUNIST-INSPIRED OR - SUPPORTED INCURSIONS IN ARGENTINA AND INDIRECTLY THROUGHOUT SOUTH AMERICA. IN ADDITION, TRAINING IN THE US TO SOME DEGREE EXPOSES THE ARGENTINE MILITARY TO US VALUE SYSTEM AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WHICH ARGENTINES ADMIRE AND EXPRESS A DESIRE TO EMULATE.

3 A (2) THE THREAT PERCEIVED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PERCEIVES AS A MAJOR THREAT BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMMUNISM. IT IS ALSO SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE DISPUTE WITH CHILE OVER BORDER AND SOVEREIGNTY RIGHTS IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA. CURRENT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ISSUE ARE AT AN IMPASSE AND BOTH COUNTRIES ARE BELIEVED TO BE REINFORCING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES IN THE EVENT OF AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. ARGENTINA IS ALREADY PUTTING ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON CHILE AND INCREASING SURVEILLANCE ON MIGRANT CHILEAN WORKERS IN ARGENTINA. OTHER EXTERNAL DISPUTES -- THE MALVINAS (FALKLAND) ISLANDS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND SHARED WATER RESOURCES WITH BRAZIL--ARE PERENNIAL BUT

CURRENTLY LESS VOLATILE PROBLEMS. THE PERCEIVED COMMUNIST THREAT HAS TAKEN ON NEW PROPORTIONS OF LATE. THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT VIEWS THE SOVIET/CUBAN SUCCESSES IN AFRICA AS BEING THE FIRST STEP TO SUBJUGATION OF THAT AREA AND A PORTENT OF THE RENEWAL EFFORTS TO ERECT COMMUNIST REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA. THE ARGENTINES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN A BITTER INTERNAL WAR TO PUT DOWN LEFT-WING SUBVERSION WHICH HAS TERRORIZED THE COUNTRY SINCE THE LATE 1960S. ECONOMIC CHAOS, RAMPANT TERRORISM AND THE INABILITY OF THE PERONIST GOVERNMENT TO COPE BROUGHT THE COUNTRY CLOSE TO ECONOMIC COLLAPSE AND ANARCHY IN 1975 AND EARLY 1976. THE INTERNAL THREAT OF TERRORISM-- BELIEVED TO BE COMMUNIST-INSPIRED--AND URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE POSED BY THE MONTONEROS AND ERP HAVE LARGELY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BUENOS 05842 01 OF 03 282115Z

BEEN DEFEATED ALTHOUGH BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES STILL OCCUR. THERE IS CONCERN IN THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF SUBVERSIVE FORCES WILL SIMPLY FIND THE LATTER INCREASING THEIR EFFORTS TO INFILTRATE THE NATION'S INSTITUTIONS AND LABOR MOVEMENTS WITH THE INTENTION OF SPARKING OFF CIVIL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUENOS 05842 02 OF 03 282135Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 SS-15 SP-02 SSO-00  
L-03 H-01 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00  
TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 ICAE-00 EB-08  
COME-00 MCE-00 /091 W  
-----004902 282239Z /13

O R 282032Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6724  
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
DOD WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 5842

UNREST AND OPPOSITION TO MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY THE  
PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

3 A (3) MISSION'S PRECEPTION OF THE THREAT. THE EXTENT  
OF COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IS DIFFICULT  
TO DETERMINE, ALTHOUGH AVAILABLE DATA CONFIRMS CONNECTIONS  
OF ARGENTINE TERRORIST GROUPS TO OTHER LEFTIST TERRORIST  
"LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS ABROAD. ARGENTINE CONCERN OVER  
THE REVIVAL OF SOVIET-CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH AMERICAN  
REVOLUTIONARY TERRORIST GROUPS AS AN ADJUNCT TO ITS AFRICA  
POLICY IS UNDERSTANDABLE.

3 A (4) HOST COUNTRY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT NEEDS.  
THE CURRENT ARGENTINE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS APPROPRIATE  
TO THE COUNTRY'S NEEDS, INSOFAR AS ARGENTINA CAN COMBAT  
THE PERCEIVED INTERNAL COMMUNIST THREAT AND STAND  
READY TO THWART POTENTIAL SOVIET-CUBAN DESIGNS ON THE  
REGION. AS FOR THE LATTER THREAT, ARGENTINA REALIZES  
THE COOPERATION AND POLICIES OF THE WESTERN WORLD ARE  
ESSENTIAL TO CONTAIN COMMUNIST EXPANSION IN THE THIRD  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 05842 02 OF 03 282135Z

WORLD. WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM  
IS NOW UNDERWAY. IN-COUNTRY PRODUCTION OF MILITARY  
EQUIPMENT IS BEING ACTIVELY PROMOTED, E.G.MN PUCARA/  
COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRCRAFT, TAM TANKS, ETC.

3 A (5) MISSION ASSESSMENT. ARGENTINA'S ARMED FORCES  
APPEAR TO BE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING THE COUNTRY AGAINST  
ANY INTERNAL OR REGIONAL EXTERNAL THREAT. THE  
STRUCTURE AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES WOULD LEND  
ITSELF TO BEING EASILY INTEGRATED INTO A MULTINATIONAL  
MILITARY FORCE. GOA STRATEGIC INTERESTS FOR THE MOST  
PART APPEAR TO PARALLEL US INTERESTS.

3 A(6) DEFENSE SPENDING AND THE ECONOMY.

1. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE  
BUDGET WERE 14.7 PERCENT IN 1977 AND ARE SCHEDULED TO  
INCREASE TO 14.9 PERCENT IN 1978. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES  
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP WERE 2.8 PERCENT IN 1977 AND ARE  
SCHEDULED TO INCREASE TO 2.9 PERCENT IN 1978.

2. THERE ARE NO FIGURES ON THE LEVEL OF MILITARY IMPORTS.

3. ARGENTINA HAS NO FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING  
PROBLEMS. ITS RESERVES CURRENTLY ARE EQUAL TO 16 MONTHS  
OF IMPORTS AND ARE AMONG THE HIGHEST IN THE WORLD BY ANY  
STANDARD COEFFICIENT.

3 A (7) PROJECTION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES.  
SEE FY 80-84 MSAP.

3 A (8) ASSESSMENT. ALL ITEMS PROJECTED ARE INTENDED  
FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND/OR REPLACEMENT OF OBSOLETE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 05842 02 OF 03 282135Z

ITEMS. BUYER INTENDS TO USE ITEMS TO MAINTAIN A VIABLE  
MILITARY FORCE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING NATIONAL INTERESTS.

3 A (9) ECONOMIC IMPACT. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT  
US LEGISLATION SCHEDULED TO GO INTO EFFECT OCTOBER 1  
WILL DENY THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA FMS CASH AND  
CREDIT AND EXPORT LICENSES FOR MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS, IT  
IS UNLIKELY GOA WILL ACQUIRE ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR  
TRAINING FROM THE US IN THE FY 1979 TIME FRAME. GOA  
HOWEVER WILL CONTINUE TO FULFILL ITS EQUIPMENT AND  
TRAINING NEEDS THROUGH PURCHASES FROM ABROAD. GOA'S  
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP ARE SMALL  
AND THE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND FOREIGN  
EXCHANGE RESERVES IS NEGLIGIBLE.

3 A (10) ARMS CONTROL IMPACT. THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT  
WOULD NOT APPEAR TO AFFECT REGIONAL STABILITY AND PROPOSED  
ACQUISITIONS WOULD NOT INTRODUCE NEW CAPABILITIES INTO  
THE REGION. HOWEVER CONTINUED PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY  
ITEMS BY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES FROM AGGRESSIVE AND  
UNRESTRICTED THIRD PARTY SALESMEN (OTHER THAN US) COULD  
LEAD TO ARMS IMBALANCE AND AN ARMS RACE.

3 A (11) HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT. THE ARGENTINE  
GOVERNMENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IS A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT  
TO CLOSE BILATERAL TIES. THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S TOP  
PRIORITY UPON TAKING OVER IN 1976 WAS TO ERADICATE  
TERRORIST GROUPS WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR WIDESPREAD  
ASSASSINATIONS; INTIMIDATION OF THE JUDICIARY, THE MILITARY,  
AND FOREIGN AND LOCAL BUSINESSES, KIDNAPPINGS AND EXTORTION.  
THE ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORT WHICH EVOLVED INCLUDED ABDUCTIONS,  
TORTURE, PROLONGED DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE UNDER THE  
COUNTRY'S STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS, SUMMARY EXECUTION  
AND HARASSMENT OF PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE LEFTIST  
IDEOLOGUES. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT  
OFFICIALLY CONSIDERS THE TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN ALL BUT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BUENOS 05842 02 OF 03 282135Z

WIPED OUT, AND THE NUMBER OF SECURITY OPERATIONS HAS  
CORRESPONDINGLY DROPPED, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROCEDURES ARE  
BELIEVED TO BE STILL EMPLOYED, PRIMARILY AGAINST PERSONS  
SUSPECTED OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. THESE FACTORS LED TO THE  
PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION WHICH WILL DENY TO GOA FMS SALES  
AND CREDITS TRAINING AND COMMERCIAL LICENSES FOR MUNITION  
LIST ITEMS EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1. US VOTES IN THE INTER-  
NATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND WITHHOLDING EXIM BANK  
CREDITS HAVE ALSO REGISTERED OFFICIAL US DISPLEASURE WITH  
GOA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS,  
GOA OFFICIALS MAINTAIN THAT THE LONG-TERM TREND  
IN ARGENTINA IS TOWARD THE RESTITUTION OF DEMOCRACY AND  
DUE PROCESS. US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY FOR  
SPARE PARTS WHICH ARE CRUCIAL TO THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES  
AND FOR TRAINING WHICH IS CONSIDERED HIGHLY DESIRABLE,  
CAN BE AN IMPORTANT TOOL, IF CAREFULLY APPLIED, TO PROD  
GOA TO EFFECT IMPROVEMENTS WE CONSIDER NECESSARY IN THE  
HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD AND TO BRING PRESSURE AGAINST THOSE IN  
THE MILITARY WHO WISH TO EXPAND THE LIST OF GROUPS AND  
PERSONS TARGETED AS SUBVERSIVES. (THE LEVERAGE IS  
ADMITTEDLY LIMITED BY ARGENTINA'S FERVENT NATIONAL PRIDE  
AND STRONG FINANCIAL POSITION, PLUS THE EASY AVAILABILITY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUENOS 05842 03 OF 03 282159Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 SS-15 SP-02 SSO-00  
L-03 H-01 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00  
TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 ICAE-00 EB-08  
COME-00 MCE-00 /091 W  
-----005514 282238Z /13

O R 282032Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6725  
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC  
UCS WASHDC  
DOD WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 5842

OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING FROM NON-US SOURCES.)  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KENNEDY-HUMPHREY ARMS EMBARGO AND  
OTHER SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA COULD CREATE A

NATIONALISTIC CHAIN REACTION RESULTING IN A MOVE TO EXPEL THE MILGROUP, NOTWITHSTANDING THE POST-WORLD WAR II HISTORICAL DESIRE OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES TO HAVE A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. UNTIL THAT COMES ABOUT, HOWEVER, AND IN VIEW OF THE REPORTING REQUIREMENT CITED IN PARA 4 (2) OF STATE 182987, WE ARE SUBMITTING THIS PAPER WITH AN EYE TO RETAINING RESIDUAL MILITARY TIES TO THE DECISION-MAKERS OF GOA.

3 A (12) MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES. MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF PURCHASED TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE IS RECEIVED MOSTLY FROM SPAIN, ITALY, FRANCE, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND ISRAEL. ARGENTINA IS SUFFICIENTLY WELL-OFF SO AS NOT TO RECEIVE ANY BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

3 A (13)  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 05842 03 OF 03 282159Z

(A) MINIMUM LEVEL (LEVEL I)

	FY 79	*6 80	FY 81	FY 82
A. IMET	\$100,000	\$110,000	\$120,000	\$130,000
B. FMS	4,000,000	4,000,000	5,000,000	5,500,000

C. DESCRIPTION: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WILL BE ONLY SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN, AT A VERY LOW LEVEL, OUR WANING INFLUENCE WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES. IT WILL PERMIT ONLY THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TRAINING, MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT SAND SPARE PARTS.

D. RISK ASSESSMENT: THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES WILL HAVE TO PURCHASE EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING FROM THIRD COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN ITS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. THE TRADITIONAL TIES BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE US IN TERMS OF MILITARY TRAINING, EXCHANGES AND SALES WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED.

#E. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS: THREE OFFICERS AND THREE LWR SECRETARIES TO ADMINISTER THE PROGRAM.

(B) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL (LEVEL II)

	FY 79	FY 80	FY 80	FY 82
A. IMET#	\$700,000	\$750,000	\$800,000	\$800,00
B. FMS	10,000,000	11,000,000	12,000,000	13,000,000

#PLUS APPROVAL OF ALL CASH TRAINING.

C. DESCRIPTION: THIS FUNDING LEVEL PERMITS ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ALL TECHNICAL AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING AND MOST

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRAINING OF MIDDLE-GRADE OFFICERS.  
SOME BADLY NEEDED EQUIPMENT SUCH AS HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS,  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 05842 03 OF 03 282159Z

PATROL BOATS AND PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT CAN BE PURCHASED  
FROM THIRD COUNTRIES.

#E MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS: SIX OFFICERS, ONE US AND  
THREE LWR SECRETARIES. INCREASE IN WORKLOAD DUE TO  
ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND PURCHASE OF NEW EQUIPMENT  
REQUIRES THIS MANNING LEVEL.

(C) CURRENT LEVEL (LEVEL III)

ARGENTINA HAD NO FMS OR IMET PROGRAM FOR FY 78. THE  
MILGP STAFF OF SIX OFFICERS, TWO US AND 8 LWRs IS CURRENTLY  
ADMINISTERING THE FY 77 PROGRAM OF \$36 MILLION IN FMS AND  
\$750,000 FOR IMET AND OTHER ON-GOING PROGRAMS FROM EARLIER YEARS.

A. RISK ASSESSMENT: THIS WOULD ALSO INHIBIT STANDARDIZATION  
WHICH WOULD WEAKEN ANY MULTINATIONAL FORCE. A COMPLETE BREAK  
WOULD IMPACT ADVERSELY ON US NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE EVENT  
A THREAT DEVELOPED WHICH REQUIRED ARGENTINE COOPERATION  
TO COUNTER. IN ESSENCE, IT MAY DENY TO THE US THE ASSISTANCE  
OF AN ALLY WHO COULD DIRECTLY SERVE TO BOLSTER US SECURITY  
IN A MULTINATIONAL HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE EFFORT.

(D) INCREMENTAL LEVEL (LEVEL V)

	FY 79	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
A. IMET	\$950,000	\$950,000	\$950,000	\$950,000
B. FMS	45,000,000	45,000,000	45,000,000	45,000,000

C. DESCRIPTION: ALL DESIRED TRAINING IN THE US AND PANAMA  
CAN BE OBTAINED. PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT FOR FORCE  
MODERNIZATION CAN PROCEED ON A PROGRAMMED BASIS WITH THE  
US BEING THE MAJOR SUPPLIER.

D. BENEFIT ASSESSMENT: STANDARDIZATION OF TACTICS AND  
EQUIPMENT WITH THE US IS ACHIEVED AT THIS FUNDING LEVEL,  
RESULTING IN AN IMPROVED DEFENSIVE POSTURE FOR THE  
AMERICAS. INCREASED CONTACT WITH US CULTURE AND CONDITIONS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BUENOS 05842 03 OF 03 282159Z

COULD PROVIDE THE ARGENTINE MILITARY PERSONNEL WITH A BETTER  
UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMERICAN VALUE SYSTEM AND POLITICAL  
SYSTEM.



#E. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS: SIX OFFICERS, SIX LWR SECRETARIES. INCREASE IN WORKLOAD RELATED TO ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRES THIS MANNING LEVEL.

#NOTE: THESE MANNING LEVELS DO NOT INCLUDE PERSONNEL NECESSARY FOR OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS, I.E., OFFICE MANAGERIAL FUNCTIONS TO INCLUDE BUDGETING, PERSONNEL FILES, TYPING AND MAINTAINING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND FILES, ETC. THIS REQUIRES TWO US PERSONNEL, ONE CIVIL SERVICE SECRETARY AND ONE OVERALL SUPERVISOR.

4. IMET PROGRAM

A. TECHNICAL TRAINING 6-12 ENLIST

B. MAINTENANCE TRAINING 9-15 OFFS; 12-18 ENL.

C. SPECIALTY TRAINING 12-18 OFFS; 15-24 ENL.

D. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
TRAINING 30-45 OFFICERS

E. THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY IS IN THE PROCESS OF RECOVERING FROM NEAR DEFAULT ON ITS INTERNATIONAL DEBT. INFLATION IS CURRENTLY NEAR 130 PERCENT A YEAR. IF ALL TRAINING HAD TO BE PURCHASED THERE WOULD BE SOME COURSES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CANCELLED BECAUSE OF OTHER HIGHER PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SAME FUNDS.

CASTRO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 28 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978BUENOS05842  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780310-1089  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** BUENOS AIRES  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t1978076/aaaaaeux.tel  
**Line Count:** 464  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** d4049e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 STATE 167901, 78 STATE 168320, 78 STATE 182987  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 25 jul 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2006421  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: ARGENTINA  
**TAGS:** MASS, MPOL, XX, AR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbs://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/d4049e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014